Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

The State of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent vs. Verd
J. Erickson, Defendant and Appellant : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys
for Respondent.
Walker E. Anderson; Attorney for Defendent.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Erickson, No. 198621055.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1528

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH SUPREME w u n .
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
45.9

l^w

DOCKE^BLaifiiS
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

Case No. 21055
Catagory #2

VERD J. ERICKSON,
Defendant-Appellant,

District Court No. CR 85-763

PETITION FOR REHEARING

WALKER E. ANDERSON, Utah Bar #113
Attorney for Appellant-Petitioner
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1035
DAVID L. WILKINSON, Utah Bar #34 72
Utah Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-5661

0 ^L*LL&
'JUN241986
„.kf Sup*:-^ Crut Utal

•

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs

Case No. 21055
Catagory #2

VERD J. ERICKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

District Court No. CR 85-763

PETITION FOR REHEARING

WALKER E. ANDERSON, Utah Bar #113
Attorney for Appellant-Petitioner
660 South 200 East, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-1035
DAVID L. WILKINSON, Utah Bar #34 72
Utah Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 533-5661

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH THE PETITIONER
CLAIMS THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED, MISAPPREHENDED OR MISAPPLIED (URAP Rule 3 5) . . .

.

. , .

ARGUMENT.

1
1

POINT I
The Decision overlooks, misapprehends
or misapplies the court (s) function
regarding entrapment. , .

1

POINT II
The Per Curiam Decision overlooks, misapprehends or misapplies the old 1978 Utah Case
of State v. Boone, 581 P.2d 571 in view of
the Legislative 1980 superceding Statute
77-23a-l, et al., Interception of Communications Act . .
POINT III
The Decision overlooks or misapprehends Dr.
Erickson's due process constitutional rights
under the 4th and 14th Amendments and the
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14. . . .

6

POINT IV
The Per Curiam Decision, citing and relying
on U.S. v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, is misapprehended or misplaced because Caceres
deals with the IRS Manual, Regulations and
Rules, not with mandatory statutes
CONCLUSION

. . .

CERTIFICATE . . . . . . . . .
ADDENDUM,

Decision

«

.

7

. .

8

. . . . . . . .

9

AUTHORITIES
Pag
7

Berger v. N.Y. , 18 L.Ed.2d 1049
Gillmor v. Gillmor (Utah), 657 P.2d 739

8

Henrie v. Rocky Mtn. Packing Co. (Utah), 202 P.2d 727 .

9

Katz v. U.S. , 19 L.Ed.2d 576

6

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 642

6

Mtn. States Tel, and Tel, v. P.S.C. (Utah) 155 P.2d 184

9

Sherman v. U.S. , 2 L.Ed.2d 848
State v. Christensen (Utah), 676 P.2d 408

2,5
6

State v. Boone (1978 Utah), 581 P.2d 571

1, 5

State v. Kourbelas (Utah), 621 P.2d 1238

3

State v. Martin (Utah), 713 P.2d 60

3

Steagald v. U.S. , 68 L.Ed.2d 38

7

U.S. v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741

1, 7

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Section 77-23 (a)-1

1, 5, 8, 9

Section 77-23 (a)-4(1)

5, 9

Section 77-23 (a)-4(2) (b)

5, 8

Section 77-23(a)-7

5, 9

Section 77-23 (a)-8

5, 8,

U. S. CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment

Pages
1,6,7

Fourteenth Amendment

1,6,7

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Article I, Section 14

1, 6, 7

POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH THE PETITIONER
CLAIMS THE COURT HAS OVERLOOKED, MISAPPREHENDED OR MISAPPLIED (URAP Rule 35)
I.

The Per Curiam Decision overlooks, misapprehends or

misapplies the court(s) function regarding entrapment.
II.

The Per Curiam Decision overlooks, misapprehends or

misapplies the old 1978 Utah case of State v. Boone, 581 P.2d
571 in view of the Legislative 1980 superceding Statute 77-23a-l,
et al., Interception of Communication Act.
III.

The Per Curiam Decision overlooks or misapprehends

Dr. Erickson!s Due Process Constitutional rights under the 4th
and 14th Amendments and the Utah Constitution, Article I Sec. 14.
IV.

The Per Curiam Decision, citing and relying on U.S. v.

Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, is misapprehended or misplaced because
Caceres deals with the IRS Manual, Regulations and Rules, not
with mandatory Statutes.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DECISION OVERLOOKS, MISAPPREHENDS
OR MISAPPLIES THE COURT(S) FUNCTION
REGARDING ENTRAPMENT
If there is an iota of evidence linked to or showing
entrapment, this defense is established as a matter of law,
"The criminal conduct charged against the defendant being the
product of the creative activity of law-enforcement officials,"

Sherman v. U.S., 2 L.Ed.2d 848; the jury conviction was reversed;
with instructions to dismiss the indictment.

* * * "We are not

choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor judging credibility"
* * *, p. 851.

"Areas of impermissible police conduct, is appro-

priate for the court and not the jury * * * the court alone * * *
no matter by whom or at what stage of the proceedings the facts
are brought to its attention * * * a jury verdict * * * cannot
give significant guidelines * * * Only the court * * * can do
this * * *," p. 858.

The Per Curiam Decision overlooks this law

function solely reserved to the court (s).

Testimony not rebutted
The first time Officer Paquette ever saw Dr. Erickson was
in his Office on the morning of May 24, and "she walked back to
the lab room and started talking to Dr. Erickson."

(R 324; 523)

"I was cleaning my instruments, and all of a sudden she was there
talking to me."

(R 337; 543)

Dr. Erickson testified, "I didn't

like the situation, so I told Ladeena (the Receptionist) to have
her come back when I figured we would be gone."

(R 339)

Ladeena

testified, "he said let's tell her to come back around 7:00.
knew we'd be done about a quarter after 6:00."
Erickson tried to "evade Kris Gordon."

(R 525)

We

(R 32 5) Dr.
After the Dental

Office was closed and locked, about 6:00 p.m., on May 24, Dr.
Erickson was at his motorcycle putting "his helmet on to leave,"
when Kris Gordon walked up.

(R 527; 325). Paquette testified

that she would contact the Doctor on Friday, May 31.

(R 305)

Matter of law
As a matter of law, the persistent criminal conduct tactics
were the product of law officers.

State v. Martin, 713 P.2d 60.

The trial court erred in not granting the motion to suppress and
dismiss (R 16; 19) and erred in failing to grant the motion for
a new trial (R 214) and erred in failing to grant the motion to
arrest judgment (R 197-206); and this court misapprehends in the
Decision, "We cannot say that defendant was entrapped as a matter
of law."
Further argument
Even though the Officers testified they had an informant,
(1) no informant was produced or testified, and (2) Officer
Paquette was asked, "Do you know anyone in the last 14-15 years
that Dr. Erickson sold drugs to?
no."

* * * A.

Other than myself,

(R 426). Prior to June 3, 1985, Dr. Erickson had (3) never

been charged with any felony, (R 33 2) (4) never been charged by
the Dental Association, (5) never been charged or reprimanded
by the Board of Regulations (R 536), and (6) never been charged
with selling any type of drugs.

(R 332)

There is no evidence that Dr. Erickson was engaged in any
criminal activity or predisposed to commit a crime, prior to the
Dental Office visits by undercover agent Officer Paquette, using
the assumed name of Kris Gordon.

In State v. Kourbelas (Utah),

621 P. 2d 1238, the conviction was reversed; "There is no evidence that defendant has previously possessed or dealt in the
drug•"
Officer Paquette came up with "some plan" to see if "I
could purchase some narcotic drugs."

(R 285-286)

She had

never seen Dr. Erickson prior to May 24, 1985 in his dental
chair.

(R 298} 383)

try to reach her.

At no time did Dr. Erickson ever call or

She went to the Dental Office (R 286; 357-

359; 378) acting pretty nervous and picking at her fingernails,
just kind of jumping around.

(R 328; 520)

While in the dental

chair, "I stated that I didn!t have a problem with my teeth,
that I just wanted to talk to the Doctor * * *."
"I really didn't want any dental work done.
he would sell me drugs."

(R 359-360)

if he would sell me narcotic drugs."

(R 286; 359)

I wanted to see if

"My intention was to see
(R 378)

"Legally from my

point of view, to buy drugs, to make a case to buy drugs."
(R 381)

Her primary objective was "to buy a narcotic drug."

(R 298; 398; 402; 422-23)

Kris Gordon took her roommate with

her for the first visit on May 24 * * * "She just came along to
make it look good * * * look normal, just kind of prop."

(R 302)

"The scenario that we wanted to provide is was that she was an
amphetamine addict and not looking for legitimate dental work,"
as testified to by Agent Mayo, and that her initial visit was
"to obtain a prescription or drugs outside the realm of professional services rendered by a dentist."

(R 450)

A casual reading of the Transcript (R 279-573) shows
that the Trial Court and the Decision overlook the totality
of the circumstances of the law-enforcement officials planning,
designing and creating the scenario for the commission of a
crime by Dr. Erickson, a person in bankruptcy.

"We conclude

from the evidence that entrapment was established as a matter
of law/1 Sherman, supra 851.
POINT II
THE PER CURIAM DECISION OVERLOOKS, MISAPPREHENDS OR MISAPPLIES THE OLD 1978
UTAH CASE OF STATE V. BOONE, 581 P.2d
571 IN VIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE 1980 SUPERCEDING STATUTE 77-23a-l, ET AL., INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATION ACT
Boone, supra, must yield to and is subordinate to the mandatory intent of the Legislature in 77-23a-l, et al, which defines
the circumstances and conditions under which law-enforcement
officials must proceed and operate, specifically apply and procure from a Utah State District Court Judge an Order authorizing
or approving the interception of wire or oral communications
(between Dr. Erickson and Officer Paquette) 77-23a-8.
The Decision misapprehends or misapplies and cites and
relies on 77-23a-4(2)(b).

This Section only relieves law-enforce-

ment officials and others similarly situated from "a felony of
the third degree," 77-23a-4(l).

Officer Paquette was unlawfully

"wired" when in the Dental Office.

77-23a-8 mandates "wire"

procedure for law-enforcement officials.

77-23a-7 mandates the

exclusionary rule.
All procedure and evidence gathered by the Officers was
tainted prior to and on May 24 through June 3—the arrest, and
should be suppressed with the charges dismissed as a matter of
law.

POINT III
THE DECISION OVERLOOKS OR MISAPPREHENDS
DR. ERICKSON'S DUE PROCESS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS UNDER THE 4th AND 14th AMENDMENTS
AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14.
There were no exigent circumstances involved here.

State

v. Christensen, 676 P.2d, at 408 (Utah 1984) provides, "Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent
circumstances require action before a warrant can be obtained,"
citing Katz v. U.S., 19 L.Ed.2d 576. A "Judicial Order could
have accommodated the legitimate needs of law enforcement,"
Katz 585.
582.

"The 4th Amendment protects people not places, Katz,

Katz ruled that electronic eaves dropping complies with

the standard of the 4th Amendment only when authorized by a
neutral magistrate upon a showing of probable cause and under
precise limits and appropriate safeguards, and that the fruits
of such surveillance conducted without such judicial authorization are inadmissible as evidence at trial.

The 4th Amendment's

right of privacy is enforceable against the States through the
Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.
642.

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.

The basic purpose of the 4th Amendment, basic to a free

society, "is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions by government officials11 * * * Berger
v. N.Y., 18 L.Ed.2d at 1049.
Dr. Erickson was a law-abiding citizen and entitled to be
left alone by the law-enforcement officials and he was and is
entitled to the safeguards of the 4th Amendment against arbitrary
invasions by government officials.
The 4th Amendment is to prevent unlawful police action,
Steagald v. U.S., 68 L.Ed.2d 38.
Based upon the fundamental fairness of the Due Process
Clauses of the 4th and 14th Amendments and Article I Section 14,
Constitution of Utah, the Constitutions call for a viewing of
the entire Record herein for the totality of the circumstances
of the unlawful police activity and as a matter of law, reversing
the conviction and setting aside the charges.

POINT IV
THE PERCURIAM DECISION, CITING AND RELYING
ON U.S. v. CACERES, 440 U.S. 741, is MISAPPREHENDED OR MISPLACED BECAUSE CACERES
DEALS WITH THE IRS MANUAL, REGULATIONS AND
RULES, NOT WITH MANDATORY STATUTES.
In Caceres, * * * "The agency was not required by the Constitution or by Statute to adopt any particular procedure or
rules before engaging in consensual monitoring and recording."
Caceres deals with the IRS Manual and IRS violation of its own
Regulations and Rules.

The present case deals with a mandatory Utah Statute,
Interception of Communication Act, 77-23a-l, et al.

The Record

shows that the law-enforcement officials ignored 77-23a-8 by
failing to apply to, and procure an Order from, a Utah State
District Court Judge for Officer Paquette to be "wired11 when in
the Dental Office-

Dr. Erickson did not know that Officer

Paquette was "wired11 when in his Office.

(R 3 34)

CONCLUSION
Because the trial court erred in matters of law in failing
to grant the Motion to Suppress (R 16) and Motion to Dismiss
(R 19) or Motion for Directed Verdict (R 517) or Motion to Arrest
Judgment and enter Judgment of Acquittal (R 197-206) and in
Sentencing defendant (R 210) based upon illegal and totally
tainted evidence, this Petition for Rehearing in banc should be
granted and the case placed on the calendar for oral argument.
* * * "On legal issues we do not defer to the trial courts'
ruling; our function is to determine that proper standards were
applied." * * * Gillmor v. Gillmor (Utah), 657 P. 2d at 739.
This Petition for Rehearing should be granted because the
Per Curiam Decision overlooks or misapprehends (1) entrapment,
(2) mandatory Utah statutes, (3) the function of the court(s) in
matters of law, and (4) cites and relies on

(a) the obsolete

Boone case, (b) 77-23a-4(2) (b) and the Caceres case which are of
no force and effect here.

Interpretation of a Statute must be based on the language
used, and courts have no power to rewrite a Statute to make it
conform to an intention not expressed.
v. P.S.C. (Utah) 155 P.2d 184.

Mtn. States Tel. and Tel

The determination of the intent

of the Legislature is a question of law for the court.
v. Rocky Mtn. Packing Co. (Utah), 202 P.2d 727.

Henrie

The Intercep-

tion of Communications Act, 77-23a-l, et al. should be read and
interpreted in its fullness.

The penalty provision 77-23a-4

cannot supercede the mandatory procedural provision 77-23a-8
and the mandatory exclusionary rule 77-23a-7.
Dr. Erickson's material and substantial rights are affected
by the Decision's oversights and misapprehensions.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Verd J. Erickson,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 21055
F I L E D
J u n e 1 7 , 198 6

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

PER CURIAM:
Defendant was charged under U.C.A., 1953,
§ 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) with unlawful distribution for value of a
controlled substance. A jury found him guilty as charged, and
he was sentenced and placed on conditional probation. As
points on appeal, he contends (1) that he was entrapped, and
(2) that certain evidence used against him should have been
suppressed.
Defendant is a dentist who practiced in Salt Lake
County. In May 1985, the Metro Narcotics Strike Force received
information that defendant, was..overpresojribing or distributing
pharmaceutical drugs to patients illegally. Undercover agent
Celeste Paguette was asked to assist with the investigation.
Ms. Paguette called defendant's office and made an appointment
for May 24, 1985, in the assumed name of Kris Gordon. When she
arrived for her appointment, Paguette filled out the requested
forms and was seated in the dental chair. She immediately
informed defendant that she did not have.a problem with her
teeth but was concerned about the effects her ingestion of
"speed" (amphetamines) was having on them. After defendant had
examined her teeth, Paguette again asked if speed is destructive
to the teeth. Defendant responded by saying that amphetamines
purchased from a pharmacist would probably be less harmful than
those purchased on the street. Paguette indicated that she did
not know a doctor who would write her a prescription. Defendant
explained that he could write prescriptions but that he disliked
doing so because they left a "paper trail." Nevertheless, he said
he would consider it and asked Paguette to return at 5:00 p.m.
When she went back to the office at 5:00 p.m., the
receptionist said the doctor was still working on a patient and
asked Paguette to return at 6:00 p.m. Paguette returned later
as requested and talked with defendant. He asked what she would
be interested in. She reminded him that he had said he could
write a prescription for an amphetamine. Defendant said he did

ADDENDUM

thirty amphetamine pills from a small bottle. He said he wanted
street value for the drugs and exchanged them for $60 in cash
offered by Paquette. Defendant stated that he would not be
back to the office until the following Friday (May 31) and that
if Paquette wanted more of the drugs, they could talk then.
On May 31, Paquette went to the office at about
5:00 p.m. and was again asked to return at 6:00 p.m. When she
returned, she met with defendant and he asked how she liked the
pills she had purchased previously. They then negotiated a
larger transaction: 1,000 amphetamine pills and 3 00 doses of
liquid "demerol" (meperidine) for $5,000. He also asked
whether she would be interested in purchasing some valium.
Paquette said she did not use that drug, but she would check
with her friends to see if they were interested. Defendant
suggested that she come to the office on Monday, June 3, on the
pretense that she was there to have her teeth cleaned. On that
appointment, Paquette told defendant her friends were not
interested in the valium, but she had the money for the
amphetamines and demerol. Defendant told her to return to the
office at 6:00 p.m. When Paquette returned at that time, defendant exchanged the amphetamines and demerol for $5,000 in
cash. On this occasion (and during most of her earlier visits
to the office), Paquette wore a "wire" which transmitted her
conversations to fellow narcotics officers stationed outside.
When the transaction was completed, approximately eight
officers entered the office and arrested defendant.
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the charges against him on—the- ground of entrapment. He also
filed a motion to suppress all physical evidence seized in the
course of the investigation and to suppress all statements
elicited from defendant. After an evidentiary hearing, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that defendant
was not entrapped as a matter of law. The court granted, in
part, the motion to suppress, but ruled admissible the evidence
received by Paquette.
At trial, the issue of entrapment was put to the
jury. Paquette testified that her primary purpose in
approaching defendant was to attempt to purchase drugs. Defendant admitted that he sold Paquette the drugs and explained
that he had done so because of financial difficulties. The
jury found defendant to be guilty as charged.
On appeal, defendant contends that he was entrapped
as a matter of law. The entrapment statute, U.C.A., 1953,
§ 76-2-303(1), provides as follows:
It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
co-operation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
No. 21055

2

evjLvaeuue ot tne commission ror prosecution
by methods creating a substantial risk that
the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it* Conduct
merely affording a person an opportunity to
commit an offense does not constitute
entrapment.
In State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979), we held that
this statute adopted the objective standard of determining
entrapment. This standard focuses solely on the fairness of
police conduct (as opposed to the predisposition of a defendant
to commit a crime). We have reversed convictions under this
section where the police have taken unfair advantage by using
"personalized high-pressure tactics or appeals to extreme vulnerability." State v. Martin, Utah, 713 P.2d 60, 62 (1986).
In the instant case, Paguette had no personal relationship with
defendant. The investigation was commenced when the police
received a report of an informant that defendant might be involved in illegally distributing drugs to his patients. On her
initial meeting with defendant, Paguette pointedly asked If defendant could furnish her with drugs. Although she returned to
defendant's office on several occasions, the visits were either
at his invitation or with his consent. Under those circumstances, we cannot say that defendant was entrapped as a matter
of law.
Defendant next contends that the evidence obtained
through electronic surveillance should have been suppressed.
He contends that the recorded conversations between him and
Paguette should not have been*^admitted-because she did-not-give
him a Miranda warning before conversing with him. A defendant
is not entitled to such a warning until custodial interrogation
has commenced. State v. Kelly, 3 3 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1986) ;
State v. Benson, Utah, 712 P.2d 256 (1985). In the instant
case, defendant was not subjected to custodial interrogation
until after his arrest. Defendant also challenges the admissibility of the recorded conversations on.the ground that the
police did not first obtain a court order authorizing the interception of the conversations. No such order was necessary since
U.C.A., 1953, § 77-23a-4(2)(b) allows the interception of wire
or oral communication by a person acting under color of law
"where that person is a party to the communication'." See
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); State v. Boone,
Utah, 581 P.2d 571 (1978).
Defendant also urges that the trial court erroneously
refused to suppress the test results on the drugs involved since
the police needed a search warrant to have the seized drugs tested.
We do not address the merits of this contention since defendant
never objected, either in his pretrial'motion to suppress or at
trial, to the introduction of the test results. Although he did
raise the issue in post-trial motions, this did not preserve the
point for appeal. See State v. Heaps, Utah, 711 P.2d 257 (1985).
The conviction is affirmed.

